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Abstract
We analyze the impact of trade in a differentiated good on environmental policy when
there is local and transboundary pollution. In autarky, the (equivalent) pollution tax is
set equal to the marginal damage from own emissions. If the strategic policy instrument
is a tax, leakage occurs under trade and tends to lower the tax. The net terms of trade
effect, due to the exportable and importable varieties of the differentiated good, tends to
increase the tax. We derive conditions under which pollution taxes under trade are higher
than the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian tax and than
that under autarky. Then, pollution falls under trade relative to autarky. When countries
use quotas/permits to regulate pollution, there is no leakage, while the net terms of trade
effect tends to make pollution policy stricter. The equivalent tax is always higher than
the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., always higher than the Pigouvian tax and
than that under autarky; hence, pollution always falls under trade. Our analysis provides
some insight into the findings in the empirical literature that trade might be good for the
environment.
JEL Classification Numbers: Q56, F18, H23.
Key Words: Strategic environmental policy, leakage effect, intra-industry trade, trans-
boundary pollution.
∗We are thankful to an Associate Editor and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions that
significantly improved the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 283 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011, USA; E-mail: hla-
pan@iastate.edu
‡Keele Management School, Keele University, Darwin Building, Keele ST5 5BG, UK; E-mail: shivasik-
dar@gmail.com
1 Introduction
The relation between trade and environmental policy has received extensive coverage due to
the concern about the detrimental effect of trade on the environment.1 Large countries can use
weaker environmental regulation as a second-best method of pursuing terms of trade goals.
Also, leakage effects (which occur when strict domestic pollution policy leads to increased
foreign pollution through changes in the world price of pollution-intensive goods) tend to make
environmental policy weaker under trade.2
Empirical studies, in contrast to the aforementioned concerns, indicate that the impact
of trade on the environment is not necessarily negative. Grossman and Krueger (1993), for
instance, find that NAFTA would have had a positive impact on the global environment. Strutt
and Anderson (2000) analyzed the case of Indonesia, which was undertaking trade liberalization,
and showed that trade reforms would improve the environment.3 Using Global Environmental
Monitoring System (GEMS) data on SO2 concentrations from 43 countries between 1971 and
1996, Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) conclude that free trade appears to be good for
the environment. Our theoretical analysis seeks to identify conditions under which trade can
be good for the environment in line with these empirical findings.
The effect of trade on environmental policy has been extensively analyzed theoretically in
both strategic and non-strategic settings.4 Most of the theoretical literature focuses on inter-
industry trade; however, it is well known that a significant proportion of trade is intra-industry
trade in similar goods between similar countries.5 This paper analyzes the effect of intra-
industry trade on environmental policies in the presence of local and transboundary pollution
when countries set their policies strategically. We show that trade can lead to stricter environ-
mental policies and consequently lower pollution than under autarky. While these results are
in keeping with the empirical findings that trade can be beneficial for the environment,6 they
arise not because of the assumption that higher incomes lead to greater demand for cleaner en-
vironment, and hence decreased pollution, but rather because of the strategic effects associated
with policy setting.
Leakage effects in the context of intra-industry trade have been analyzed in Rauscher (1997),
chapter 6, and Gu¨rtzgen and Rauscher (2000) using the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic
competition. Also, Fung and Maechler (2007) use a two country “price-setting duopoly model”
along the lines of Brander and Krugman (1983) to examine the effect of trade liberalization on
1See, for instance, Environment and Trade, A Handbook, 2005, published by the United Na-
tions Environment Programme and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (available at
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2005/envirotrade handbook 2005.pdf).
2See, for instance, Rauscher (1997), Yanase (2007), and Lapan and Sikdar (2011). Gu¨rtzgen and Rauscher
(2000) discuss other mechanisms through which leakage occurs.
3See also Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) for a two-country CGE model calibrated to Indonesia and Japan which
finds that trade liberalization can lower emissions and raise welfare simultaneously.
4See, for instance, Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a comprehensive and critical review of the issues.
5See Gruber and Lloyd (1975) for one of the earliest analysis. Other empirical studies on intra-industry trade
include Tharakan (1984), which points out the increase in intra-industry trade between OECD and developing
countries, and Bernhofen (1999), which examines intra-industry trade in petrochemicals between Germany and
the United States.
6When property rights for renewable resources are imperfect, Karp, Sacheti and Zhao (2001) show that trade
can make the property rights regime stricter.
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the environment. However, these papers analyze the effect of a change in the policy of one of
the two countries, while the other country holds its policy fixed. Although the strategic (Nash)
equilibrium where both countries choose policies non-cooperatively would be of interest, given
their framework, as Gu¨rtzgen and Rauscher (2000) point out, “this is an intractable problem”.
In contrast to these papers, which consider unilateral policy, we analyze the strategic game
between two policy-active countries when environmental policy is the strategic variable in each
country and also compare outcomes under different policy instruments. To maintain tractability,
we use a perfectly competitive framework of intra-industry trade rather than the monopolistic
competition framework.
Haupt (2006) examines strategic interactions between countries with respect to environmen-
tal standards in a model of monopolistic competition when pollution is purely local; hence, there
is no possibility of leakage.7 On the other hand, in our model with local and transboundary
pollution, we compare environmental taxes and quotas in a strategic setting when leakage is
possible.
Benarroch and Weder (2006) analyze the interaction between intra-industry trade in inter-
mediate goods and pollution. Pollution is generated only when “dirty intermediaries” are used
in the production of the nontradable final good. However, pollution is purely local, i.e., there is
no transboundary pollution; hence, there is no possibility of leakage. They consider a pollution
tax as the policy instrument and do not examine strategic policy setting between countries. In
contrast, we analyze strategic environmental policy in the presence of transboundary pollution
and intra-industry trade in final goods. Further, we compare outcomes under different policy
instruments, pollution taxes and quotas.
Our analysis, thus, adds to the existing literature on intra-industry trade and environmental
policy by incorporating strategic policy setting in a setup in which there is transboundary
pollution (hence, leakage can occur). Our results also provide some reconciliation with the
empirical literature that trade can be good for the environment even though we do not assume
that higher income resulting from opening up to trade leads to increased demand for a cleaner
environment (hence, pollution abatement).
In our two country model, each country produces a different variety of a differentiated final
consumption good, along with a homogeneous good, under perfectly competitive conditions.
Intra-industry trade in the differentiated good arises due to consumers’ preference for both va-
rieties of the differentiated good, which are imperfect substitutes (see Armington, 1969). One
example of such differentiated products is food and agricultural products; heterogeneity in these
products (for instance, meat, wine, rice, cheese) and also seasonal variations can lead to intra-
industry trade in these goods. It should also be noted that, while agricultural products have
had special treatment under the GATT/WTO, there has been a significant push by countries
to further liberalize agricultural trade and this underscores the relevance of our analysis of the
7To see why transboundary pollution is a prerequisite for leakage effects, assume the home country exports
the pollution-intensive good. Strict home pollution policy reduces world supply of the good, increases its world
price and, thus, foreign production of the pollution-intensive good (and foreign emissions). The accompanying
increase in the incidence of transboundary pollution from the foreign to the home country reduces the latter’s
marginal benefit from regulating own emissions. This leakage effect tends to lower the home pollution tax. Of
course, without transboundary pollution, the increase in foreign emissions does not have any impact on home
welfare and hence, no effect on the home pollution tax.
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environmental impact of such changes in regulation. Pollution reduces consumers’ welfare in
both countries, i.e., there are both local and transboundary negative welfare effects of pollu-
tion. In this setup, we analyze the impact of trade on environmental policies when countries
simultaneously and strategically set domestic environmental policies.
Under autarky, each country sets the (equivalent) domestic pollution tax equal to the
marginal damage from own pollution and both policy instruments, taxes and quotas,8 result in
the same outcome. With trade in the differentiated good, which is assumed to be relatively more
pollution-intensive,9 the equivalency of environmental taxes and quotas breaks down. When
taxes are the strategic variables, the net terms of trade effect tends to increase the environ-
mental tax.10 The leakage effect reduces each country’s marginal benefit from environmental
regulation; this tends to lower the pollution tax. Trade leads to stricter environmental poli-
cies, i.e., higher taxes, in both countries if the net terms of trade effect dominates the leakage
effect. This occurs if, for instance, the volume of trade is high or the transboundary spillover
of pollution is low. Hence, despite leakage effects, the pollution taxes are higher than the re-
spective marginal damages from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian taxes and than
the autarky taxes. This leads to a fall in pollution in both countries.
When countries use pollution quotas, rather than taxes, the net terms of trade effect tends to
lower the number of quotas. There is no leakage effect when the strategic variable is pollution
quotas. The equivalent taxes in both countries are higher than the respective marginal damages
from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian taxes and than the autarky (equivalent)
taxes. Hence, intra-industry trade lowers pollution when the policy instrument is quotas.
Our results suggest a possibly positive effect of trade on the environment, even in strategic
settings when there is both local and transboundary pollution. This is in keeping with the
empirical evidence discussed at the beginning of this section that free trade may, in fact, be
good for the environment.
The model is presented in the next section, while section 3 analyzes strategic environmental
policies and compares outcomes under different policy instruments, taxes and quotas. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
Opening a country to trade can lead to changes in environmental outcomes for a variety of
reasons. First, trade will, in general, change the mix of goods produced in each country. The
8Note that these quotas/permits may be auctioned by the authorities and may be traded domestically.
9Bernhofen (1999), and Fung and Maechler (2007) provide evidence that industries in which intra-industry
trade occur are often pollution-intensive. Also, if one thinks of the differentiated good in terms of agricultural
products, Stern (2006) estimates that 35% of world greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture (including
livestock production). Furthermore, as McMichael et al. (2007) point out “greenhouse-gas emissions from the
agriculture sector account for about 22% of global total emissions; this contribution is similar to that of industry
and greater than that of transport.” Hence, our assumption of the differentiated good being relatively more
pollution-intensive seeks to capture these empirical findings about the pollution intensity of goods in which
intra-industry trade occurs.
10Countries could use environmental policies to circumvent free trade agreements which forbid the use of trade
policies. For empirical evidence on environmental policies being used as secondary means of achieving terms of
trade motives, see Ederington and Minier (2003).
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impact of this effect on pollution depends, of course, on the relative pollution intensities of the
exportable and importable goods. Second, ignoring pollution and any other market failure,
trade will raise real income levels and hence increase the demand for normal goods; thus, if a
clean environment is a normal good, trade will affect environmental policy through this income
effect. Third, if there are asymmetries between countries such that one country cares less about
pollution than others, this will lead to a shift of pollution-intensive production to countries
which care less about pollution, and hence may lead to increased pollution levels. Finally,
opening economies to trade leads to a strategic dimension in setting environmental policy. In
constructing our model, we focus on this fourth aspect, and hence structure the model so that
our results are driven purely by this strategic policy setting effect.
We consider a model of intra-industry trade between two large countries, a home country
and a foreign country (foreign variables are denoted by *). Two varieties, X and X∗, of a
differentiated good are produced only in the home country and the foreign country, respectively,
along with a homogeneous good, Y , which is produced in both countries. The production
possibility frontiers of the home and foreign countries are, respectively:11
g(x, y, z;
−→
V ) ≥ 0 and g∗(x∗, y∗, z∗;−→V ∗) ≥ 0, (1)
where gx, g
∗
x∗ , gy, g
∗
y∗ < 0 < gz, g
∗
z∗ , gvi , g
∗
v∗i
; z (z∗) is home (foreign) emissions and
−→
V (
−→
V ∗)
is the vector of home (foreign) inputs. Note that X and X∗ are different varieties of the
differentiated good. This specification of the production possibility function nests the case
in which pollution is generated in either or both sectors. It also allows for the possibility of
abatement, substitutability between inputs, and having polluting and non-polluting inputs.
Let cx, cx∗ and cy (c
∗
x, c
∗
x∗ and c
∗
y) denote consumption of X, X
∗ and Y in the home (foreign)
country. Preferences of the representative agents in the home and foreign countries are given
by, respectively:
U(cx, cx∗ , cy, z, z
∗) = φ(cx, cx∗ , cy)−ψ(z, z∗) and U∗(c∗x, c∗x∗ , c∗y, z∗, z) = φ∗(c∗x, c∗x∗ , c∗y)−ψ∗(z∗, z),
where φcx , φcx∗ , φ
∗
c∗x , φ
∗
c∗
x∗
, φcy , φ
∗
c∗y , ψz, ψz
∗ , ψ∗z , ψ∗z∗ > 0; φ(.) and φ∗(.) are twice differentiable and
concave, while ψ(.) and ψ∗(.) are strictly convex. Total disutility from pollution, ψ(.) and ψ∗(.),
consists of two components: disutility from domestic emissions, i.e., due to local pollution, and
from the inflow of transboundary pollution from the other country. In the home country, for
instance, the marginal disutility from own emissions (local pollution) is ψz(.), while the marginal
disutility from the inflow of transboundary pollution from the foreign country is ψz∗(.). Note
that additive pollution, i.e., the situation in which pollution is a global public bad, is subsumed
in our setup as a special case. That is, ψ(z, z∗) can be of the form ψ(z + z∗), which would
be relevant for the analysis of global warming issues. Some examples of non-additive pollution
damage would be those of acid rain and water pollution, where there can be some local clean-up
and transboundary spillover is not complete or there can be more transboundary effect than
11Note that when we focus on the symmetric equilibrium, the functional forms, for example g(.) and g∗(.), will
be the same across countries, despite the arguments being different. We use ∗ to denote foreign functions for the
sake of clarity.
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local effect depending on the flow of air/water.12
Let Y be the numeraire good, i.e., set the price of Y , py ≡ 1. Let p and p∗ be the (world)
prices of X and X∗, respectively. Suppose both countries use taxes on own emissions, t and t∗,
which are the only policy instruments, respectively,13 to regulate pollution. The GNP functions
for the home and foreign countries are:14
R(p, t) and R∗(p∗, t∗).
Home and foreign expenditure functions are,15 respectively:
e(p, p∗, u+ ψ(z, z∗)) and e∗(p, p∗, u∗ + ψ∗(z∗, z)).
For more details on the dual general equilibrium approach, see Dixit and Norman (1980).
In keeping with the empirical findings of Bernhofen (1999), and Fung and Maechler (2007)
that industries in which intra-industry trade take place are often pollution-intensive, we assume
that the differentiated good is relatively more pollution-intensive (see footnote 9):
Assumption 1. X and X∗ are relatively more pollution-intensive than Y , i.e., Rpt < 0 and
R∗p∗t∗ < 0.
By definition, intra-industry trade is trade in similar goods, which implies that different
varieties of the differentiated good would be substitutes in consumption:
Assumption 2. X and X∗ are substitutes, i.e., epp∗ > 0 and e∗pp∗ > 0.
Hence, if the price of either variety of the differentiated good increases, demand for the
other variety of the differentiated good increases in both countries. Also, following Armington
(1969), we assume that the home and foreign varieties of the differentiated good are imperfect
substitutes. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume:
Assumption 3. The own price effects are greater than the cross price effects, i.e., |epp| ≥ |epp∗ |,
|e∗pp| ≥ |e∗pp∗ |, |ep∗p∗ | ≥ |ep∗p|, and |e∗p∗p∗ | ≥ |e∗p∗p|.
An increase in the price of the home variety of the differentiated good reduces demand for
that good, X. Also, an increase in the price of X∗ increases demand for the substitute good, X.
Assumption 3 implies that a change in the price of X leads to a higher change in the demand
for X as compared to a change in the price of X∗.
12Emissions from northern US power plants have in the past had more effect on southern Canada than on the
rest of the US. Also, depending on winds, Chinese emissions have been a leading contributor to the pollution
levels in California.
13This can be due to trade agreements that restrict the use of trade policies. Moreover, given WTO obligations
which generally forbid the use of tariffs or quotas, this seems to be the natural path to take.
14The GNP function is given by R(p, t) = maxx,y,z{px+y− tz} such that g(x, y, z;−→V ) ≥ 0. Standard envelope
properties of this function imply Rt = −z and Rtt = −zt. If all firms face the same prices for goods, for the
factors, v, and the externality, then individual profit maximization, together with factor market equilibrium, will
lead to GNP maximization, or the revenue function as defined above.
15Due to the presence of the externality, the expenditure function is given by: mincx,cx∗ ,cy (pcx + p
∗cx∗ +
cy) s.t. φ(cx, cx∗ , cy)− ψ(z, z∗) ≥ u⇒ mincx,cx∗ ,cy (pcx + p∗cx∗ + cy) s.t. φ(cx, cx∗ , cy) ≥ u+ ψ(z, z∗).
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Assumption 4. Preferences are such that:
A. the optimal level of pollution is independent of income levels, i.e., euu = e
∗
u∗u∗ = 0, and
B. the income elasticity of demand for the different varieties of the differentiated good, X and
X∗, is zero, i.e., epu = ep∗u = e∗pu∗ = e∗p∗u∗ = 0.
Assumption 4A follows our earlier discussion that we focus on channels through which
trade affects environmental outcomes that are not tied to changes in income. Since ∂(∂e/∂z)∂u =
∂(euψz)
∂u = euuψz, euu = 0 ⇒ the demand for cleaner environment (pollution/abatement) does
not change with income. Assumption 4B simplifies our analysis, and under the assumption that
differentiated goods are the drivers of pollution, removes an indirect channel through which
income effects would affect pollution. Hence, our results are not driven by income effects which
lead to higher demand for environmental quality, resulting in stricter environmental policies.
The changes in policies in our setup are driven purely by strategic considerations.
We are going to focus on the symmetric equilibrium; this seems natural given the empirical
observation that a significant proportion of intra-industry trade is between similar countries.16
Our assumptions imply that preferences are of the following form:
U(cx, cx∗ , cy, z, z
∗) = cy+Θ(cx, cx∗)−ψ(z, z∗) and U∗(c∗x, c∗x∗ , c∗y, z∗, z) = c∗y+Θ∗(c∗x, c∗x∗)−ψ∗(z∗, z),
(2)
where Θ(.) and Θ∗(.) are strictly concave functions, while ψ(.) and ψ∗(.) are strictly convex
functions of their respective arguments. Furthermore, following the standard practice for differ-
entiated goods models, we will assume that Θ(.) and Θ∗(.) are CES functions of their respective
arguments. However, to allow the elasticity of demand for the CES aggregate to take on different
values, we assume:
Θ(cx, cx∗) =
A
α
[θ(cx, cx∗)]
α, where θ(cx, cx∗) = [(cx)
ρ + (cx∗)
ρ)]
1
ρ , A > 0, α < 1, and ρ ∈ (0, 1),
Θ∗(c∗x, c
∗
x∗) =
A
α
[θ∗(c∗x, c
∗
x∗)]
α, where θ∗(c∗x, c
∗
x∗) = [(c
∗
x)
ρ + (c∗x∗)
ρ)]
1
ρ , A > 0, α < 1, and ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Given the basic specification of preferences in eq. (2), the elasticity of substitution between
the different varieties of the differentiated good is σ ≡ 11−ρ , whereas α determines the elasticity
of demand for the CES aggregate. Thus, as the price of the CES aggregate decreases, total
spending on the differentiated goods will increase (decrease) as α is greater than (less than)
zero.17 To economize on space, we present the analysis leading to Lemma 1 and Assumption 5
(and in most of the paper) for the home country only; the foreign country’s analysis is similar.
Given expenditure (e˜) on the differentiated variety of goods, optimization yields the following
16Countries are said to be symmetric if they have the same preferences and technology. Furthermore, symmetry
implies that ψ(z, z∗) = ψ∗(z˜∗, z˜), ∀z, z∗ s.t. z˜∗ = z and z˜ = z∗. However, despite being symmetric, recall that
the home and foreign countries produce different varieties, X and X∗, respectively, of the differentiated good
along with the homogeneous numeraire good, Y .
17In the limiting case, as α → 0, the function becomes Θ(cx, cx∗) = A ln(θ(cx, cx∗)), with a unitary price
elasticity of demand with respect to the CES aggregate price index. For this case, aggregate spending on the
differentiated goods – and hence total demand for the differentiated goods – will be unaffected by changes in the
price aggregator due to opening the economy up to trade.
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demand and indirect utility functions for this class of goods:
c?x =
e˜
(p)σ(P)1−σ
, c?x∗ =
e˜
(p∗)σ(P)1−σ
, θ(c?x, c
?
x∗) =
e˜
P
,
where c?x and c
?
x∗denote the optimal consumption levels of X and X∗, respectively, while P =
[(p)1−σ +(p∗)1−σ]
1
1−σ is the price index for the differentiated (tradable) good. Under symmetry,
the above can be written as:
c?x =
e˜
np
, c?x∗ =
e˜
np∗
, θ(c?x, c
?
x∗) =
e˜
P
, where P ≡ n 11−σ p,
and n = 2 is the number of varieties of the differentiated good. Hence, given e˜, total demand
(across all countries) for any variety of the differentiated good is unchanged due to the movement
from autarky to free trade; however, consumer utility increases. In essence, ceteris paribus,
trade lowers the effective price of the differentiated (tradable) good. The consumers’
optimization problem can then be written as:
max
e˜
U
(
e˜
P
, cy, z, z
∗
)
such that e˜+ cy = I,
where I is the income level. It is straightforward to see that:
Lemma 1. Given policies and the world prices of goods, opening up to trade increases (de-
creases) the spending on, and the demand for, the differentiated/tradable good, and hence pol-
lution, if the price elasticity of demand for the tradable aggregate is greater (less) than one.
This follows since the price index of the differentiated (tradable) good falls as countries move
from autarky to trade.
If the production of the differentiated good (which is relatively more pollution-intensive)
increases, so does pollution. Lemma 1 implies that, given environmental policies, trade increases
(decreases) pollution if the price elasticity of demand between the tradable aggregate and the
homogeneous numeraire good is greater (lower) than one.18 For the rest of the paper, to focus
on the role of policy instruments in strategic settings, we assume:
Assumption 5. The aggregate price elasticity of demand for the differentiated (tradable) good
is one.
This implies that, given environmental policies, opening up to trade has no effect on aggre-
gate pollution.19 Hence, our results are purely driven by strategic policy setting considerations.
Timing and Equilibrium. Let ν and ν∗ denote the policy variables of the home and foreign
governments, respectively, which will be either pollution taxes or quotas. Under profit maxi-
mization, home production of the differentiated and numeraire goods depend on the domestic
relative price of the differentiated good and the domestic policy variable, (p, ν), while foreign
18Of course, if the differentiated good is relatively less pollution-intensive than the numeraire good, then –
given environmental policies – opening up to trade will increase (decrease) pollution when the relevant price
elasticity is less (greater) than one.
19Note that an elasticity of less (greater) than one would strengthen (weaken) our results, although the quali-
tative results are likely to be the same as presented here.
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production decisions depend on (p∗, ν∗). Home consumption of the tradable goods depends on
(p, p∗), and foreign consumption of tradables also depends on (p, p∗).20
Actions are taken in the following sequence:
1. Governments simultaneously choose their policy variables, given their beliefs about the
other government’s policy and the behavior of private agents, and the resulting relationship
between these policies and market clearing prices, pe(ν, ν∗) and p∗e(ν, ν∗).
2. Given the observed policy variables, producers and consumers simultaneously make their
production and consumption decisions based on their beliefs about prices.
3. Trade occurs and markets clear.
Given this timing, a Nash equilibrium under trade is a set of policy rules, (Γe,Γ∗e), and
market clearing prices, (pe, p∗e), such that each government chooses its policy variable to maxi-
mize the utility of its representative agent, firms choose their production decisions to maximize
profits, consumers choose their consumption decisions to maximize utility, all markets clear,
and all agents beliefs are correct.21
3 Strategic Environmental Policy
We now consider each country’s non-cooperative environmental policy choice when policies are
set simultaneously.
3.1 Pollution Taxes
When countries use pollution taxes to regulate pollution, the equilibrium is described by the
resource constraints for the two countries and market clearing conditions for the non-numeraire
goods:
e(p, p∗, u+ ψ(z, z∗)) = R(p, t) + tz, (3)
e∗(p, p∗, u∗ + ψ∗(z∗, z)) = R∗(p∗, t∗) + t∗z∗, (4)
ep(.) + e
∗
p(.) = Rp(.), ep∗(.) + e
∗
p∗(.) = R
∗
p∗(.), z = −Rt(.), z∗ = −R∗t∗(.). (5)
We have assumed that all tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to consumers. Eqs. (3) and
(4) stipulate that total expenditure has to equal the sum of total revenue from the sale of goods
and tax revenues in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Eq. (5) implies that total
demand for each variety of the differentiated good equals supply of the good, while standard
envelope properties of the GNP function imply z = −Rt and z∗ = −R∗t∗ .
20Demand for the numeraire good, of course, is obtained from the budget constraint. By Walras Law, equi-
librium in the markets for different varieties of the differentiated good implies equilibrium in the market for the
numeraire good.
21The notion of an equilibrium without trade is similar, but less complicated because there is no strategic game
involved.
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Differentiating eq. (3) with respect to t, gives us the effect of a change in the home country’s
tax rate on its welfare via different channels:22
eu
du
dt
= (Rp − ep)dp
dt
− ep∗ dp
∗
dt
+ (t− euψz)dz
dt
− euψz∗ dz
∗
dt
. (6)
Given that the home country exports X, i.e., (Rp − ep) > 0, the first term, the terms of trade
effect for X, depends on the relative pollution intensity of X, which determines the change in
the price of X following a change in the pollution tax. The second term is the terms of trade
effect for X∗; since X and X∗ are substitutes and the home country is an importer of X∗,
ep∗ > 0, this effect depends on the change in the price of the foreign variety of the differentiated
good, p∗, due to a change in t. The third term is the effect of a change in t on welfare via a
change in domestic emissions. The last term is the leakage effect, which works through a change
in the price of X∗ (hence, its production and foreign emissions) in response to a change in t.
The home country’s best response function as a function of the foreign country’s tax can be
derived by setting dudt = 0 in eq. (6):
J(t, t∗) ≡ du
dt
= 0. (7)
Similarly, the best response function of the foreign country is given by setting du
∗
dt∗ = 0 in:
e∗u∗
du∗
dt∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗p∗)
dp∗
dt∗
− e∗p
dp
dt∗
+ (t∗ − e∗u∗ψ∗z∗)
dz∗
dt∗
− e∗u∗ψ∗z
dz
dt∗
, (8)
i.e., J∗(t, t∗) ≡ du
∗
dt∗
= 0. (9)
We assume that the second-order conditions for welfare maximization are satisfied: ∂J∂t < 0
and ∂J
∗
∂t∗ < 0. In the symmetric equilibrium, uniqueness is guaranteed if J(t, t
∗), evaluated at
t = t∗, is monotonically decreasing in t. Hence,
(
∂J(t,t∗)
∂t +
∂J(t,t∗)
∂t∗
) ∣∣∣
t=t∗
< 0 ensures a unique
symmetric equilibrium and we assume this to hold.
Pareto Efficient Taxes. The Pareto efficient pollution taxes are obtained by solving a social
planner’s problem that maximizes one country’s welfare subject to meeting a given utility target
for the other country:
te = euψz + e
∗
u∗ψ
∗
z and t
e∗ = e∗u∗ψ
∗
z∗ + euψz∗ , (10)
The efficient pollution tax in each country equals the sum of marginal damages in the two coun-
tries. Hence, efficiency requires that countries internalize both the domestic and transbound-
ary effects of their emissions. Note that, since the income elasticity of demand for pollution
22Note that the following analysis rests on the assumption that the income effect on the demand for the
differentiated good is zero (Assumption 4B). Apart from ensuring that the results are not driven by income
effects, this simplifies the algebra by making the system of equations to be solved block-recursive. Further, if
Assumptions 4B and 5 do not hold, then the movement from autarky to trade will change production of the
tradables, and hence will change emissions, given the level of the policy variables.
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abatement is zero, the Pareto efficient taxes are independent of the utility distribution across
countries.
Autarky. Eqs. (7) and (9) can be solved for the optimal autarky pollution taxes when coun-
tries set policies simultaneously. In autarky, domestic production equals domestic consumption,
i.e., Rp(.) = ep(.) and ep∗(.) = 0, and foreign pollution is independent of domestic policy,
23 i.e.,
dz∗
dt = 0; hence, eq. (6) implies eu
du
dt = (t − euψz)dzdt . Since dzdt < 0 and eu > 0, it follows that
the optimal autarky pollution tax for the home country is:
ta = euψz. (11)
Similarly, the optimal autarky tax in the foreign country is:
ta∗ = e∗u∗ψ
∗
z∗ .
Countries set emission taxes equal to the domestic marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., the
autarky taxes equal the Pigouvian taxes. Comparing the efficient and autarky taxes, eqs. (10)
and (11), it is clear that the autarky solution, although optimal from each country’s perspective,
is inefficient from the global perspective as governments do not internalize the transboundary
effects of their emissions. Note that, if there is no transboundary pollution, the autarky taxes
would be Pareto efficient. Next, we turn to the situation in which there is trade and countries
set environmental policies non-cooperatively.
Intra-Industry Trade and Pollution Taxes. When there is intra-industry trade, emis-
sions in any country are affected by the environmental policy in the other country. The mecha-
nism works through changes in the (world) prices of different varieties of the differentiated good
in response to a change in the pollution policy in any country.
The following lemma (proved in the Appendix) establishes the effect of a change in the
pollution tax in either country on the prices of the home and foreign varieties of the differentiated
good:
Lemma 2. An increase (a reduction) in the pollution tax in either country causes the prices of
both the home and foreign varieties of the differentiated good to increase (reduce). Specifically,
dp
dt
=
[A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ ]Rpt
D
> 0,
dp∗
dt
= −BRpt
D
> 0, (12)
and
dp
dt∗
= −BR
∗
p∗t∗
D
> 0,
dp∗
dt∗
=
[A−Rpp]R∗p∗t∗
D
> 0,
where A ≡ epp + e∗pp < 0, A∗ ≡ ep∗p∗ + e∗p∗p∗ < 0, B ≡ epp∗ + e∗pp∗ > 0 and D = (A−Rpp)(A∗ −
R∗p∗p∗)−B2 > 0.
As the home pollution tax increases, the cost of production and hence, the price of the home
variety of the differentiated good, which is pollution-intensive, also increases; thus, dpdt > 0.
23This is because the countries set policies simultaneously. If countries set policies sequentially, even under
autarky, the follower’s pollution depends on the leader’s policy. See, for instance, Sikdar and Lapan (2012) for
details on the possibility of leakage under autarky.
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Further, as the price of X increases, i.e., as p ↑ due to an increase in t, consumers substitute
away from X in favor of the foreign variety of the differentiated good (X∗). This increased
demand for X∗ in response to an increase in t leads to a higher (world) price of the foreign
variety of the differentiated good; hence, dp
∗
dt > 0. Similar mechanisms lead to changes in p and
p∗ as t∗ changes.
Envelope properties of the GNP functions imply z = −Rt ⇒ dzdt = −Rtt − Rpt dpdt , and
z∗ = −R∗t∗ ⇒ dz
∗
dt =
dz∗
dp∗
dp∗
dt = −R∗p∗t∗ dp
∗
dt . Hence, the home country’s best response function,
eq. (7), gives us (using Lemma 2, eq. (12), and since eu > 0):
t =
>0︷︸︸︷
euψz −
<0︷︸︸︷
Mx
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ ]
<0︷︸︸︷
Rpt
∆︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade effect for X
+
>0︷︸︸︷
Mx∗
<0︷︸︸︷
Rpt
>0︷︸︸︷
B
∆︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade effect for X∗
−
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
euψz∗
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
R∗p∗t∗Rpt
>0︷︸︸︷
B
∆︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
leakage effect
, (13)
where Mx = ep − Rp < 0 and Mx∗ = ep∗ > 0 are the home country’s import of X and
X∗, respectively. We define ∆ ≡ DRtt + R2pt(e∗p∗p∗ − R∗p∗p∗ + ep∗p∗), which simplifies to ∆ =
(RttRpp − R2pt)R∗p∗p∗ + (µ + µ∗ + γ + γ∗)Rtt − AR∗p∗p∗Rtt + (−A∗)(RttRpp − R2pt) > 0, where
µ ≡ eppep∗p∗ − (epp∗)2 ≥ 0, µ∗ ≡ e∗ppe∗p∗p∗ − (e∗pp∗)2 ≥ 0, γ ≡ eppe∗p∗p∗ − epp∗e∗pp∗ ≥ 0 and
γ∗ ≡ ep∗p∗e∗pp − epp∗e∗pp∗ ≥ 0. That ∆ is positive follows from the convexity of the GNP
functions and the concavity of the expenditure functions, along with our assumption on the
own and cross price effects (Assumption 3). The first term in eq. (13), euψz, is the marginal
damage from own emissions. In the absence of terms of trade and leakage effects, the optimal
tax equals this marginal damage (for instance, under autarky, eq. (11)). The two terms of
trade effects imply that a large country will tax (subsidize) domestic production in the export
(import-competing) sector to improve its terms of trade if commercial policies are not available;
here the implicit subsidy to the import-competing sector is in the form of lower pollution taxes.
An increase in t reduces the home country’s production of X, resulting in an increase in p. Since
X and X∗ are substitutes in consumption, demand for X∗ increases and, hence, p∗ ↑. This,
in turn, increases foreign production of X∗, and hence, foreign emissions. The increased inflow
of transboundary pollution from the foreign to the home country reduces the latter’s welfare;
this leakage effect reduces the home country’s marginal benefit from regulating own emissions;
hence, it lowers the pollution tax.
It is worth pointing out that, without our earlier assumptions, even at the same levels of
the policy instruments, the term euψz can be different under trade than in autarky. That is, in
moving from autarky to trade, if the relative price of tradables changes then, even at the same
value of the policy variable, output of tradables, and hence pollution, changes; thus ψz changes.
Hence, even if we ignore the terms of trade and leakage effects, the first term, euψz, evaluated
at the same level of the policy variables can be either higher or lower under trade relative to
autarky. Our Assumptions 4 and 5 guarantee that, when evaluated at the same value of the
policy variables, this term is unchanged. This can be seen from eq. (6); suppose we evaluate,
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under trade, the following expression at the level of the autarky policy variables:
eu
∂u
∂t
∣∣∣
ta,ta∗
= (ta − euψz)dz
dt
+ (Rp − ep)dp
dt
− ep∗ dp
∗
dt
− euψz∗ dz
∗
dt
.
In our analysis, we focus on the last three terms terms, under the assumption the first term is
zero, and use that to compare the autarky and trade equilibrium. However, since the movement
from autarky to trade, even in the case of symmetric countries, could change the production
mix and pollution levels – given the policy variables – we cannot always conclude, without our
assumptions, that the first term is zero (i.e., if production changes, emissions change and thus
ψz changes).
Now, going back to our analysis, eq. (13) simplifies to:
t = euψz +
{
Rpt
[
M∗x(A∗ −R∗p∗p∗) +Mx∗B
]
∆
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
net terms of trade effect, > 0
−
{
euψz∗R
∗
p∗t∗RptB
∆
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
leakage effect, > 0
, (14)
where M∗x = e∗p > 0 is the foreign country’s import of X and we have used the equilibrium
condition Mx+M
∗
x = 0. The last term, the leakage effect, is positive, which lowers the pollution
tax. Given that own price effects dominate cross price effects (Assumption 3), |A∗| ≥ B; under
symmetry, M∗x = Mx∗ > 0. Hence, the term [M∗x(A∗ − R∗p∗p∗) + Mx∗B] can be written as
M∗x(A∗+B−R∗p∗p∗) and is negative. Since Rpt < 0, the net terms of trade effect (the combined
effect of the terms of trade effects for X and X∗) is strictly positive and increases the pollution
tax. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1. Suppose pollution taxes are the strategic policy variables. Then,
1. the leakage effect lowers the pollution tax,
2. the terms of trade effect due to the exportable variety of the differentiated good increases
the pollution tax,
3. the terms of trade effect due to the importable variety of the differentiated good lowers the
pollution tax, and
4. the net terms of trade effect increases the pollution tax.
An increase in the home country’s pollution tax increases the price of X (its export good)
and hence, home welfare. The accompanying increase in the price of the substitute good (X∗),
the home country’s importable good, results in a loss to the home country. Since the own price
effects are stronger than the cross price effects, the terms of trade effect for the exportable good
(X) dominates that for the importable good (X∗). Hence, the benefit of higher taxes dominates
the loss due to increased taxes, and the net terms of trade effect increases the pollution tax.
Since the overall terms of trade effect works in the opposite direction from the leakage effect,
the final outcome depends on which effect dominates:
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Corollary 1. If countries use pollution taxes to regulate pollution, trade leads to higher (lower)
taxes and lower (higher) pollution if the net terms of trade effect dominates (is dominated by)
the leakage effect.
From eq. (14), we see that the net terms of trade effect dominates the leakage effect if (since
∆ > 0 and Rpt < 0):
M∗x(A
∗ −R∗p∗p∗) +Mx∗B < euψz∗R∗p∗t∗B,
i.e., M∗x(A
∗ −R∗p∗p∗ +B) < euψz∗R∗p∗t∗B, (since, under symmetry, M∗x = Mx∗ > 0),
i.e.,
M∗x
euψz∗
>
R∗p∗t∗B
A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ +B
, (since A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ +B < 0).
Hence, on the one hand, the higher the volume of trade (larger M∗x), the larger is the net terms of
trade effect, ceteris paribus; then, it is more likely that trade leads to an increase in the pollution
tax. On the other hand, the greater the marginal damage from transboundary pollution, ψz∗(.),
the stronger is the leakage effect; then, it is more likely that the pollution tax is lower under
trade. Hence, intra-industry trade can have a positive impact by increasing environmental taxes
due to the dominance of the net terms of trade effect over the leakage effect. In such situations,
the pollution taxes in both countries will be higher than the respective marginal damages from
own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian and autarky taxes, while pollution will be lower
under trade.
Suppose pollution is purely local, i.e., there is no transboundary pollution. Since ψz∗(.) = 0
for the home country, there is no leakage effect and the last term in eq. (14) disappears. Hence,
t = euψz +
{
Rpt
[
M∗x(A∗ −R∗p∗p∗) +Mx∗B
]
∆
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
and we have:
Corollary 2. Suppose pollution is purely local, i.e., there is no transboundary pollution. If the
policy instrument is a tax on pollution, the net terms of trade effect increases the pollution tax
and pollution is lower under trade relative to autarky.
Hence, with purely local pollution, the taxes in both countries are higher than the respective
marginal damages from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian and autarky taxes, while
pollution falls as countries open up to trade.
If the two varieties of the differentiated good, X and X∗, are perfect substitutes in consump-
tion, then we are in a situation of inter-industry trade and the net terms of trade effect depends
only on net exports. Given symmetry and simultaneous moves, net exports are zero around
the autarky equilibrium and around the autarky solution, the net terms of trade effect is zero.
Hence, the leakage effect lowers the pollution tax under trade. Then, trade liberalization leads
to lower pollution taxes purely due to the leakage effect. Lapan and Sikdar (2011) find a similar
result in their analysis of inter-industry trade. In contrast, we show that, with intra-industry
trade, pollution policies can be stricter compared to autarky.
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3.2 Pollution Quotas
Now, suppose governments use (domestically tradable) pollution quotas to regulate pollution,
i.e., governments in both countries set upper bounds on own emissions. Hence, z ≤ L and
z∗ ≤ L∗, where L and L∗ are the emission limits in the home and foreign countries, respectively.
Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their quota levels to maximize own
welfare. Denote the value of a quota in the home (foreign) country as τ (τ∗). When the quotas
are auctioned off or traded domestically,24 then τ and τ∗ are the market prices of quotas.
Equilibrium is now described by:
e(p, p∗, u+ ψ(z, z∗)) = R(p, τ) + τL, (15)
e∗(p, p∗, u∗ + ψ∗(z∗, z)) = R∗(p∗, τ∗) + τ∗L∗, (16)
ep(.) + e
∗
p(.) = Rp(.), ep∗(.) + e
∗
p∗(.) = R
∗
p∗(.), z = −Rτ (.) ≤ L, z∗ = −R∗τ∗(.) ≤ L∗, (17)
where eqs. (15), (16) and (17) are the income constraints for the home and foreign countries, and
the market clearing conditions, respectively. The quota revenues (rents) are rebated lump-sum
to consumers. If the quotas bind, τ > 0, τ∗ > 0, and eq. (17) holds with equality.
Differentiating eq. (15) with respect to L gives us the impact of issuing an additional quota
on domestic welfare:
eu
du
dL
= (Rp − ep) dp
dL
− ep∗ dp
∗
dL
+ (τ − euψz) dz
dL
− euψz∗ dz
∗
dL
. (18)
The first and second terms are the terms of trade effects due to X and X∗, respectively; these
depend on the pattern of trade and the relative pollution intensity of the differentiated good.
The third term is the domestic pollution effect, while the last term is the leakage effect. If
foreign emissions change following a change in the home quota level, i.e., if leakage occurs, it
affects the home country’s welfare due to a change in the incidence of transboundary pollution.
The home country’s best response function in terms of the foreign country’s quota is derived
by setting dudt = 0 in eq. (18):
J(L,L∗) ≡ du
dL
= 0. (19)
The foreign country’s best response function is given by setting du
∗
dL∗ = 0 in:
e∗u∗
du∗
dL∗
= (R∗p∗ − e∗p∗)
dp∗
dL∗
− e∗p
dp
dL∗
+ (τ∗ − e∗u∗ψ∗z∗)
dz∗
dL∗
− e∗u∗ψ∗z
dz
dL∗
,
i.e., J∗(L,L∗) ≡ du
∗
dL∗
= 0.
As before, we assume that the second-order conditions for welfare maximization are satisfied:
∂J
∂L < 0 and
∂J∗
∂L∗ < 0. Also, uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium requires J(L,L
∗), evaluated
at L = L∗, is monotonically decreasing in L. Hence,
(
∂J(L,L∗)
∂L +
∂J(L,L∗)
∂L∗
) ∣∣∣
L=L∗
< 0 ensures a
24For analysis of international trade in pollution quotas along with trade in goods, see Copeland and Taylor
(1995), Lapan and Sikdar (2011), and Antoniou, Hatzipanayotou and Koundouri (2012).
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unique symmetric equilibrium.
Autarky. In autarky, domestic consumption equals domestic production, i.e., ep(.) = Rp(.)
and ep∗(.) = 0, the quota binds, i.e., z = L, and foreign pollution is independent of domestic
policy, i.e., dz
∗
dL = 0; hence, from eq. (18), we have eu
du
dL = τ − euψz. Setting dudL = 0, the
pollution tax equivalent of the optimal autarky pollution quota in the home country is (since
eu > 0):
τa = euψz. (20)
Similarly, the foreign pollution tax equivalent of the optimal autarky pollution quota is:
τa∗ = e∗u∗ψ
∗
z∗ .
The prices of quotas in both countries equal the respective Pigouvian taxes (the respective
marginal damages from own emissions). Thus, comparing eqs. (11) and (20), we have:
Proposition 2. Under autarky, when countries set environmental policies non-cooperatively,
pollution taxes and quotas are equivalent. The optimal pollution tax (equivalent) equals the
domestic marginal damage from own pollution.
Hence, in autarky, the choice of policy instrument does not have any differential impact
on environmental outcomes. The price of pollution quotas is the same as the optimal tax on
emissions in autarky.
Intra-Industry Trade and Pollution Quotas. Now, we consider the situation in which
there is trade and countries set pollution quota levels strategically. The following lemma (proved
in the Appendix) gives us the effect of changes in quota levels on the prices of the different
varieties of the differentiated good:
Lemma 3. An increase (a reduction) in the quota level in either country leads to a decline
(an increase) in the prices of both the home and foreign varieties of the differentiated good.
Specifically,
dp
dL
= −(A
∗ −G∗)Rpτ
DˆRττ
< 0,
dp∗
dL
=
BRpτ
DˆRττ
< 0, (21)
and
dp
dL∗
=
BR∗p∗τ∗
DˆR∗τ∗τ∗
< 0,
dp∗
dL∗
= −(A−G)R
∗
p∗τ∗
DˆR∗τ∗τ∗
< 0,
where G ≡ RppRττ−R2pτRττ > 0, G∗ ≡
R∗
p∗p∗R
∗
τ∗τ∗−R∗2p∗τ∗
R∗
τ∗τ∗
> 0 and Dˆ = (AA∗ − B2) + (−AG∗) +
(−A∗G) + (GG∗) > 0; A ≡ epp + e∗pp < 0, A∗ ≡ ep∗p∗ + e∗p∗p∗ < 0, and B ≡ epp∗ + e∗pp∗ > 0 are
as defined earlier.
To see how a change in the quota level affects prices, suppose the home country increases
its quota limit. This increases production of the home pollution-intensive good, i.e., the home
variety of the differentiated good, X, thereby reducing its world price; hence, dpdL < 0. Due to
the lower world price of X in response to higher home pollution quotas, consumers substitute
away from the foreign variety, X∗, in favor of the home variety, X, of the differentiated good
which lowers the price of X∗; hence, dp
∗
dL < 0. Similar mechanisms imply
dp∗
dL∗ < 0 and
dp
dL∗ < 0.
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Lemma 4. When pollution quotas are the strategic policy variables, there is no leakage under
intra-industry trade. That is,
dz∗
dL
= 0 and
dz
dL∗
= 0.
The proof appears in the Appendix. To see why there is no leakage when countries use
quotas to regulate pollution, suppose the home and foreign countries set their quota levels at
L = L˜ and L∗ = L˜∗, respectively. If the home country lowers its quota limit, i.e., if L < L˜,
there is an increase in the world price of the home country’s pollution-intensive good, i.e., p ↑.
In response to this higher world price of X, demand for the substitute good (X∗) increases,
leading to an increase in the world price of the foreign variety of the differentiated good, i.e.,
p∗ ↑. Hence, the foreign country increases its production of the pollution-intensive good, X∗,
but since the foreign quota binds, foreign emissions are unchanged.25 Thus, dz
∗
dL = 0 in the
domain L < L˜. Furthermore, if the home country increases its quota level from L˜, there is
a decline in the world price of the home pollution-intensive good (the home variety of the
differentiated good), X, i.e., p ↓. As consumers substitute away from X∗ in favor of X, there is
a decline in the world price of the foreign variety of the differentiated good (X∗), i.e., p∗ ↓. The
market price of foreign pollution quotas declines, but is still positive, τ∗ > 0, and the foreign
quota still binds (implying that foreign emission is unchanged). Thus, in response to changes in
the home quota level, foreign production can change, but since the foreign quota binds, foreign
emissions cannot change, i.e., dz
∗
dL = 0. Similarly, changes in the foreign quota level do not
change home emissions, i.e., dzdL∗ = 0. Hence, there is no leakage when countries use quotas to
regulate pollution.
The home country’s best response function, eq. (19), gives us (using Lemma 3, eq. (21),
Lemma 4, and since eu > 0):
τ =
>0︷︸︸︷
euψz −
<0︷︸︸︷
Mx
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(A∗ −G∗)
<0︷︸︸︷
Rpτ
∆ˆ︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade effect for X
+
>0︷︸︸︷
Mx∗
>0︷︸︸︷
B
<0︷︸︸︷
Rpτ
∆ˆ︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of trade effect for X∗
,
where ∆ˆ = DˆRττ and euψz is the marginal damage from own emissions. These terms of trade
effects imply that a large country will overregulate (underregulate) the domestic export (import-
competing) sector. This implies the following price of quotas, i.e., equivalent tax on pollution,
in the home country:
τ = euψz +
{
Rpτ [M
∗
x(A
∗ −G∗) +Mx∗B]
∆ˆ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
, (22)
where we have used the equilibrium condition Mx + M
∗
x = 0. Since ∆ˆ > 0, G
∗ > 0, Rpτ < 0,
|A∗| ≥ B (by Assumption 3), and under symmetry, M∗x = Mx∗ > 0, the second term {. . .} in
25Since the foreign quota limit binds, foreign emissions are unchanged while foreign production of the pollution-
intensive good, X∗, can increase. This is possible, for instance, due to increased abatement in the foreign country.
16
eq. (22) is strictly positive. Hence, the net terms of trade effect increases the market price of
quotas, i.e., lowers the level of quotas under intra-industry trade. We summarize these results
as follows:
Proposition 3. If pollution quotas are the strategic policy instruments, then
1. there is no leakage,
2. the terms of trade effect due to the exportable variety of the differentiated good lowers the
quota levels,
3. the terms of trade effect due to the importable variety of the differentiated good increases
the quota levels,
4. the net terms of trade effect lowers the quota levels.
Hence, the price of quotas, i.e., the equivalent tax on pollution, is higher than the marginal
damage from own emissions and than that under autarky. Pollution in both countries are lower
under trade than in autarky.
On the one hand, lower quota levels, say, in the home country improve home welfare by
increasing the price of the home export good (X). On the other hand, the increased price of
X causes consumers to shift from consumption of X to X∗ leading to an increase in the price
of the home import good (X∗), thereby lowering home welfare. Since the own price effects
are stronger than the cross price effects, the former dominates the latter, and the net terms of
trade effect makes pollution policy stricter under trade. This, along with the fact that there is
no leakage when the strategic variable is a quantitative limit on emissions, implies that trade
lowers pollution if countries use pollution quotas to regulate domestic emissions. The equivalent
pollution taxes in both countries are always higher than the respective marginal damages from
own emissions, i.e., always higher than the Pigouvian taxes and than the autarky levels due to
the net terms of trade effect.
Now, suppose pollution is purely local, i.e., there is no transboundary pollution. From eq.
(18), it is clear that there is no change in the best response function and an analysis similar to
the one above applies. Hence, we have
Corollary 3. Suppose pollution quotas are the policy instruments. If pollution is purely local,
i.e., there is no transboundary pollution, the pollution tax equivalent is higher than the marginal
damage from own emissions and than that under autarky. Pollution falls under trade relative
to autarky.
If X and X∗ are perfect substitutes, we are in a situation of inter-industry trade and the net
terms of trade effect depends only on net exports. Under symmetry and simultaneous moves,
net exports of each country is zero around the autarky equilibrium and there is no change
in the quota level under trade as compared to autarky. Hence, the autarky and the free trade
equilibria will be the same. Lapan and Sikdar (2011) find a similar result in the context of inter-
industry trade. However, with intra-industry trade, we find that the environmental outcomes
are different under trade compared to autarky, and trade can be beneficial for the environment.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the effect of intra-industry trade on environmental policies in the presence of local
and transboundary pollution in a strategic setting. In autarky, each country sets its (equivalent)
pollution tax equal to the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., equal to the Pigouvian
tax. When the strategic policy instrument is a pollution tax, the effect of intra-industry trade
on environmental policy depends on the relative strengths of the net terms of trade effect
(which tends to increase the tax) and the leakage effect (which tends to reduce the tax). If
the volume of trade is small or the damage from transboundary pollution spillover is large,
then intra-industry trade makes environmental policy weaker ; whereas if the volume of trade
is large or the damage from transboundary pollution is low, then intra-industry trade makes
environmental policy stronger. On the other hand, when the strategic policy variable is pollution
quotas, intra-industry trade always leads to stricter environmental policies. This is because,
under quotas, there is no leakage effect and the net terms of trade effect increases the equivalent
tax on emissions; hence, the equivalent pollution taxes (prices of quotas) in both countries are
always higher than the respective marginal damages from own emissions, i.e., higher than the
Pigouvian and autarky taxes. Then, pollution in both countries fall under trade. Given the
possible differential outcomes under taxes and quotas under trade, it might be beneficial for
countries to negotiate on the policy instrument that will be used to regulate pollution, if not
the exact level of the policy.
We have also shown that the net terms of trade effect always tends to make pollution policy
stricter in both countries when countries use pollution policies strategically under intra-industry
trade. This is in contrast to models of inter-industry trade, in which the terms of trade effect
tends to make environmental policy stricter in the country which exports the pollution-intensive
good and weaker in the country which imports the pollution-intensive good. Intra-industry trade
can, thus, have a positive impact on environmental policies by making pollution policies stricter
in both countries, which tends to increase the (equivalent) taxes above the respective marginal
damages from own emissions. This is in line with the empirical findings that trade can be
beneficial for the environment even though the mechanism is different from the usual one of
income effects used to explain this result.
We have focused on a two-country model of intra-industry trade and transboundary pol-
lution. However, our results would generalize to a situation in which the number of countries
is n > 2.26 To begin with, holding policies fixed, consider the effect of trade on production
(and pollution): under trade, the consumption of own (other) variety of the differentiated good
falls (rises), while exports (imports) of the own (other) variety of the differentiated good in-
creases (decreases). However, holding policies fixed, aggregate production (hence, pollution)
is unchanged due to a movement to trade provided the set of assumptions used in this paper
continue to hold. The strategic motives to change policies due to terms of trade and leakage
effects remain the same as in the two-country model. Thus, with n > 2 countries, under trade,
emission taxes in all countries increase if the terms of trade effect dominates the leakage ef-
fect, while the equivalent taxes, when quotas are the strategic variables, always increase in all
26Of course, Assumptions 1 – 5 would have to be suitably modified (although in essence remaining the same)
to account for n > 2 symmetric countries and different varieties of the differentiated good.
18
countries.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Taking the total differential of eqs. (3) and (5), we have
eudu+ (euψz − t)dz + euψz∗dz∗ = (Rp − ep)dp− ep∗dp∗, dz = −Rttdt−Rptdp. (23)
Similarly, totally differentiating eqs. (4) and (5), we have
e∗u∗du
∗+(e∗u∗ψ
∗
z∗−t∗)dz∗+e∗u∗ψ∗zdz = (R∗p∗−e∗p∗)dp∗−e∗pdp, dz∗ = −R∗t∗t∗dt∗−R∗p∗t∗dp∗. (24)
Totally differentiating eq. (5) yields:
[(epp −Rpp) + e∗pp]dp+ [epp∗ + e∗pp∗ ]dp∗ = Rptdt, (25)
and [(e∗p∗p∗ −R∗p∗p∗) + ep∗p∗ ]dp∗ + [epp∗ + e∗pp∗ ]dp = R∗p∗t∗dt∗. (26)
Eqs. (23), (24), (25) and (26) can be written in matrix form (after simplification) as:
eu 0 Mx −Rpt(euψz − t) Mx∗ −R∗p∗t∗euψz∗
0 e∗u∗ M∗x −Rpte∗u∗ψ∗z M∗x∗ −R∗p∗t∗(e∗u∗ψ∗z∗ − t∗)
0 0 (epp −Rpp) + e∗pp epp∗ + e∗pp∗
0 0 epp∗ + e
∗
pp∗ (e
∗
p∗p∗ −R∗p∗p∗) + ep∗p∗


du
du∗
dp
dp∗

=

Rtt(euψz − t)dt+R∗t∗t∗euψz∗dt∗
Rtte
∗
u∗ψ
∗
zdt+R
∗
t∗t∗(e
∗
u∗ψ
∗
z∗ − t∗)dt∗
Rptdt
R∗p∗t∗dt∗
 , (27)
where Mx = ep −Rp < 0 (M∗x = e∗p > 0) is the home (foreign) import of X and Mx∗ = ep∗ > 0
(M∗x∗ = e∗p∗ − R∗p∗ < 0) is the home (foreign) import of X∗. In equilibrium, Mx +M∗x = 0 and
Mx∗ +M
∗
x∗ = 0. The last two equations in the above system, eq. (27), imply[
dp
dp∗
]
=
1
D
[
A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ −B
−B A−Rpp
][
Rptdt
R∗p∗t∗dt∗
]
, (28)
where D is the determinant of the first matrix on the RHS of eq. (28) and we define A ≡
epp+e
∗
pp < 0, A
∗ ≡ ep∗p∗+e∗p∗p∗ < 0, B ≡ epp∗+e∗pp∗ > 0. Define µ ≡ eppep∗p∗−(epp∗)2 ≥ 0, µ∗ ≡
e∗ppe∗p∗p∗ − (e∗pp∗)2 ≥ 0 and χ ≡ −AR∗p∗p∗ − A∗Rpp > 0. Concavity of the expenditure functions
determines the sign of µ and µ∗, while convexity of the GNP functions along with concavity of
the expenditure functions guarantee that χ > 0. Further, define γ ≡ eppe∗p∗p∗ − epp∗e∗pp∗ ≥ 0
and γ∗ ≡ ep∗p∗e∗pp − epp∗e∗pp∗ ≥ 0. Own price effects being stronger than cross price effects
(Assumption 3) imply that γ, γ∗ ≥ 0. Thus, the determinant, D, in eq. (28) can be written as:
D = (A−Rpp)(A∗ −R∗p∗p∗)−B2 = (µ+ µ∗ + γ + γ∗) + χ+ (RppR∗p∗p∗) > 0.
19
Hence, from eq. (28), we have the effects of changes in pollution taxes on the prices of the
differentiated good:
dp
dt
=
[A∗ −R∗p∗p∗ ]Rpt
D
> 0,
dp∗
dt
= −BRpt
D
> 0,
and
dp
dt∗
= −BR
∗
p∗t∗
D
> 0,
dp∗
dt∗
=
[A−Rpp]R∗p∗t∗
D
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Taking the total differential of eq. (15) we have
eudu+ euψzdz − τdL+ euψz∗dz∗ = (Rp − ep)dp− ep∗dp∗; dz = dL. (29)
Similarly, totally differentiating eq. (16) we have
e∗u∗du
∗ + e∗u∗ψ
∗
z∗dz
∗ − τ∗dL∗ + e∗u∗ψ∗zdz = (R∗p∗ − e∗p∗)dp− e∗pdp; dz∗ = dL∗. (30)
Eq. (17) implies [
(epp −Rpp) + e∗pp +
R2pτ
Rττ
]
dp+ [epp∗ + e
∗
pp∗ ]dp
∗ = −Rpτ
Rττ
dL, (31)
and [
epp∗ + e
∗
pp∗
]
dp+
[
(e∗p∗p∗ −R∗p∗p∗) + ep∗p∗ +
R∗2p∗τ∗
R∗τ∗τ∗
]
dp∗ = −R
∗
p∗τ∗
R∗τ∗τ∗
dL∗. (32)
Eqs. (29), (30), (31) and (32) can be written in matrix form (after simplification) as:
eu 0 Mx Mx∗
0 e∗u∗ M∗x M∗x∗
0 0 (epp −Rpp) + e∗pp + R
2
pτ
Rττ
epp∗ + e
∗
pp∗
0 0 epp∗ + e
∗
pp∗ (e
∗
p∗p∗ −R∗p∗p∗) + ep∗p∗ +
R∗2
p∗τ∗
R∗
τ∗τ∗


du
du∗
dp
dp∗

=

(τ − euψz)dL+ euψz∗dL∗
−e∗u∗ψ∗zdL+ (τ∗ − e∗u∗ψ∗z∗)dL∗
−RpτRττ dL
−R
∗
p∗τ∗
R∗
τ∗τ∗
dL∗
 . (33)
From the last two equations in the above system, eq. (33), we have
[
dp
dp∗
]
=
1
Dˆ
[
A∗ −G∗ −B
−B A−G
] −RpτRττ dL
−R
∗
p∗τ∗
R∗
τ∗τ∗
dL∗
 , (34)
where we define G ≡ RppRττ−R2pτRττ > 0 and G∗ ≡
R∗
p∗p∗R
∗
τ∗τ∗−R∗2p∗τ∗
R∗
τ∗τ∗
> 0; A ≡ epp + e∗pp < 0,
A∗ ≡ ep∗p∗ + e∗p∗p∗ < 0, and B ≡ epp∗ + e∗pp∗ > 0 are as defined earlier. Dˆ = (AA∗ − B2) +
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(−AG∗) + (−A∗G) + (GG∗) > 0 is the determinant of the first matrix on the RHS of eq. (34).
Thus, the price effects of changes in the quota levels are:
dp
dL
= −(A
∗ −G∗)Rpτ
DˆRττ
< 0,
dp∗
dL
=
BRpτ
DˆRττ
< 0,
and
dp
dL∗
=
BR∗p∗τ∗
DˆR∗τ∗τ∗
< 0,
dp∗
dL∗
= −(A−G)R
∗
p∗τ∗
DˆR∗τ∗τ∗
< 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since gx, gy < 0 < gz and gx∗ , gy∗ < 0 < gz∗ , pollution quotas in both
countries always bind, i.e., z = L and z∗ = L∗ implying dzdL = 1 and
dz∗
dL∗ = 1. Hence, a change in
the quota level in one country has no impact on the emissions of the other country, i.e., dz
∗
dL = 0
and dzdL∗ = 0. Q.E.D.
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